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| Improving Prediction | of Cyber Attacks Us | sing Ensemble Modeling | | TIAL /BELLTO EVEN |
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IMPROVING PREDICTION OF CYBER ATTACKS USING ENSEMBLE MODELING

June 17, 2014 82nd MORSS Alexandria, VA

Tom Donnelly, PhD Systems Engineer & Co-insurrectionist JMP Federal Government Team

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Improving Prediction of Cyber Attacks Using Ensemble Modeling

In 1998 DARPA developed a representative cyber-attack data set with over 20 attack types, 41 potentially causal factors, and nearly 5 million rows of data. These and derivative data are analyzed using a variety of predictive models, including nominal logistic, decision trees, and neural models. It will be shown that the ability to predict attacks can be further improved by averaging models. Both simple algebraic averaging of model probabilities as well "ensemble modeling" - where models are used as inputs to other models - will be demonstrated.







OUTLINE

- Goals
- Background
- Approaches and Strategies
- Model Averaging
- Visualize Results
- Summary









- Take "Data Mining Challenge" data set and develop best predictor model
- Learn about different approaches to data mining and model averaging







ORIGINAL KDD DATA SET

TABLE I

STATISTICS OF REDUNDANT RECORDS IN THE KDD TRAIN SET

| | Original Records | Distinct Records | Reduction Rate |
|---------|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| Attacks | 3,925,650 | 262,178 | 93.32% |
| Normal | 972,781 | 812,814 | 16.44% |
| Total | 4,898,431 | 1,074,992 | 78.05% |

TABLE III

STATISTICS OF RANDOMLY SELECTED RECORDS FROM KDD TRAIN SET

| | Distinct Records | Percentage | Selected Records |
|-------|------------------|------------|------------------|
| 0-5 | 407 | 0.04 | 407 |
| 6-10 | 768 | 0.07 | 767 |
| 11-15 | 6,525 | 0.61 | 6,485 |
| 16-20 | 58,995 | 5.49 | 55,757 |
| 21 | 1,008,297 | 93.80 | 62,557 |
| Total | 1,074,992 | 100.00 | 125,973 |





ATTACK TYPE BINNING

| Distributions | | | | | | |
|--|--|------------|----------------|----------|----------|-------------|
| Attack Type | | Attack | Type - 4 Class | + normal | Attack C | lass Binary |
| warezmaster warezclient teardrop spy smurf satan rootkit portsweep pod | 20 890 892 2 2646 3633 10 2931 201 | u2r r2l | 52 995 | | normal | 67343 |
| phf perl normal nmap neptune multihop | 4 3 67343 1493 41214 7 | probe | 11656 | | | |
| loadmodule land ipsweep imap | , 9 18 3599 11 | normal | 67343 | | anomaly | 58630 |
| guess_passwd ftp_write buffer_overflow back | 53 8 30 956 | dos | 45927 | | | |





RANDOM HOLDBACK SUBSETS 60% TRAIN = 0, 20% VALIDATE = 1, AND 20% TEST = 2



The Elements of Statistical Learning – Data Mining, Inference, and Prediction Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman – 2001 (Chapter 7: Model Assessment and Selection)





HONEST ASSESSMENT APPROACH USING TRAIN, VALIDATE (TUNE), AND TEST SUBSETS



Test Data in Orange







ACTUAL VS. PREDICTED FOR TEST SUBSET FOR FOUR MODELS USING ALL 41 FACTORS





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| ENSEMBLE MODELS BF AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normal dos Attack Type - 4 Class + normal dos 13317 14 Attack Type - 4 Class + normal dos 9217 5 8 0 0 Scatterplot Matrix Holdback=2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 or mormal probe 0 <th></th> <th>H</th> <th>oldbacl</th> <th>k</th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | H | oldbacl | k | | | | | | |
|--|----------------------|----------|---|--------------|----------------------|-----------|--------|--------|---------|-----------|----------|---------|---------|----------------------|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|--------|----------------------|-----------|----------|-------|
| BF AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normal MODELS Attack Type - 4 Class + normal probe rel / 13317 18 41 2 Attack Type - 4 Class + normal go / 10 | | E | NSI | EMB | LE | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | |
| Attack Type - 4 Class + normal dos normal probe r2l u2r dos 9217 5 8 0 0 normal 6 13317 18 41 2 probe 0 10 2382 0 0 u2r 0 7 0 174 0 u2r 0 2 0 0 6 Scatterplot Matrix Holdback=2 dos | | | М | ODE | | | | | | | BF A | VG WG | T Most | Likely | Attack | Туре | - 4 Class | + no | rma | | | |
| dos 9217 5 8 0 0 probe 6 13317 18 41 2 12 0 7 0 174 0 u2r 0 2 0 0 5 Scatterplot Matrix Holdback=2 0 0 2 0 0 5 12 0 0 2 0 0 5 1317 18 41 12 0 0 2 0 0 5 Scatterplot Matrix Holdback=2 0 -4++ -4++ -4+++ -4++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ | | | | UDE | LJ | Att | ack Ty | pe - 4 | Class + | ⊦ norma | | dos | n | ormal | | probe | r2l | | u2r | | | |
| normal 6 13317 18 41 2 probe 0 10 2332 0 0 scatterplot Matrix Holdback=2 0 7 0 174 0 dos 6 0 7 0 174 0 ormal 6 0 2 0 0 6 Scatterplot Matrix Holdback=2 0 0 2 0 0 6 ormal ++ <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>dos</td><td>5</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>9217</td><td></td><td>5</td><td></td><td>8</td><td>0</td><td></td><td>0</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<> | | | | | | dos | 5 | | | | | 9217 | | 5 | | 8 | 0 | | 0 | | | |
| probe 0 10 2382 0 0 22 0 0 7 0 174 0 6 Scatterplot Matrix Holdback=2 dos 0 7 0 174 0 6 dos 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 <th0< th=""> 0 <th0< th=""></th0<></th0<> | | | | | | nor | mal | | | | | 6 | | 13317 | | 18 | 41 | | 2 | | | |
| Scatterplot Matrix Holdback=2 | | | | | | pro | be | | | | | 0 | | 10 | | 2382 | 0 | | 0 | | | |
| Uzr U | | | | | | r21 | | | | | | 0 | | 7 | | 0 | 174 | | 0 | | | |
| Scatterplot Matrix Holdback=2 | | | | | | u2r | • | | | | | 0 | | 2 | - | 0 | 0 | | 6 | | | |
| dos improve | Scatt | erplot N | latrix | Holdba | ack=2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| normal probe r2l u2r dos normal probe r2l u2r bF wgt Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normal OUTPUTS OF FIRST TWO MODELS USED AS INPUTS FOR LAST TWO MODELS HOLD AS T TWO MODELS HOLD H | | dos – | | 800 | 0 00 0 00 0 00 | | | | | 0 | | 0 | | ° ® | 0 00 00 00 00 | | | | °°° | ° 00 | | |
| grupper probe prob< probe probe < | ma | normal – | +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ | | 難 | 攡 | 幸幸+ | 轥 | | | | | 荐 | | | 轠 | + + | ** | | 轠 | 轠 | |
| Image: second | ack Type ss + nor | probe – | | | | ۰, | | 00 | here | | | 80 | | \$ ^ | | | | \$ | ¢ ₫₿ _↓ | | | |
| u2r Image: Constraint of the second seco | Atta Cla | r2l – | | × | | | × | | × | | | × | | ×** | | | | | × | | | × |
| dos normal prober2lu2rdos normal prober2lu2rdos normal prober2lu2rdos normal prober2lu2rBF wgt Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBN wgt Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBF AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBN AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBN AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalOUTPUTS OF FIRST TWO MODELS USED AS INPUTS FOR LAST TWO MODELSBN AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBN AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalAttack Type - 4 Class + normalAttack Type - 4 Class + normaldosnormal prober2lu2rdos92225300000131325523662701017900012121200101791017910 | | u2r – | | | | | | | | | | | | ${\rm a}^{\!\Delta}$ | | | \$\$ | | | | | |
| BF wgt Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBN wgt Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBF AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBN AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normal 2OUTPUTS OF FIRST TWO MODELS USED AS INPUTS FOR LAST TWO MODELSBN wgt Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBN AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBN AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalAttack Type - 4 Class + normalAttack Type - 4 Class + normalBN AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalAttack Type - 4 Class + normaldosnormalprober2lU200000 | | | dos | normal | probe | r2l | u2r | dos | norma | al probe | r2l | u2r | dos | normal | probe | r2l | u2r | dos | normal | probe | r2l | u2r |
| Type - 4 Class + normalType - 4 Class + normalAttack Type - 4 Class + normalType - 4 Class + normal 2OUTPUTS OF FIRST TWO MODELS USED AS INPUTS FOR LAST TWO MODELSHoldback2Attack Type - 4 Class + normaldosnormalprober2lu2dos92225300normal1313255236627probe26238400r2lu2r0101791 | | | | BF wgt M | lost Like | ely Attao | ck | E | 3N wgt | Most Like | ely Atta | ck | В | ۶ AVG | NGT Mo | ost Likel | у | BN A | VG WG | T Most | Likely A | ttack |
| HoldbackHoldbackENAVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalMODELS USED MODELS FOR LAST TWO MODELSAttack Type - 4 Class + normaldos92225300normal1313255236627probe262384000r2l01017933 | | | | Type - 4 | Class + | norma | I | | Type - | 4 Class + | norma | l | Atta | ck Type | - 4 Clas | ss + noi | rmal | T | ype - 4 | Class + | normal | 2 |
| OUTPUTS OF FIRST TWO MODELS USED AS INPUTS FOR LAST TWO MODELS2Attack Type - 4 Class + normalBN AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalMODELS USED AS INPUTS FOR LAST TWO MODELSAttack Type - 4 Class + normaldosnormalprober2lu201313255236627010179101210179101791 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ŀ | loldba | aci | | | |
| FIRST TWOBN AVG WGT Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + normalMODELS USEDAttack Type - 4 Class + normaldosnormalprober2lu2dos922253000 <td></td> <td>007</td> <td>ΓΡυ</td> <td>JTS (</td> <td>OF</td> <td></td> <td>2</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> | | 007 | ΓΡυ | JTS (| OF | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | |
| MODELS USED AS INPUTS FOR LAST TWO MODELSAttack Type - 4 Class + normal dosdosnormalprober2lu2dos9222530000normal1313255236627probe262384000MODELSu2r00000 | | FI | IRS | т ти | VO | | | | | | | | | BN / | AVG W | GT Mo | st Likely | Atta | ck Type | e - 4 Cla | ass + n | ormal |
| AS INPUTS FOR dos 9222 5 3 0 0 LAST TWO normal 13 13255 23 66 27 MODELS r2l 0 11 0 179 12 | | MOD | ELS | USI | ED | | | | A | ttack Ty | vpe - 4 | Class + | • norma | | dos | | norma | I | prol | oe 📃 | r2l | u2 |
| LAST TWO normal 13 13255 23 66 27 MODELS probe 2 6 2384 0 0 u2r 0 1 0 179 2 | Δ | S INF | PUT | 'S FC | DR | | | | d | los | | | | | 9222 | | ! | 5 | | 3 | 0 | (|
| Image: Constraint of the second sec | | | | T T M | | | | | n | ormal | | | | | 13 | | 1325 | | | 23 | 66 | 27 |
| | | | .43 | | | | | | p | robe | | | | | 2 | | | 1 | 23 | 84 | 170 | (|
| | | | M | UDE | LS | | | | | 21 2r | | | | | 0 | | . (| ר ר | | 0 | 1/9 | - |



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APPROACHES & STRATEGIES

- "Honest Assessment" Approach Divide Data into Train, Validate, & Test Sets
- Model 4 Largest of 22 Attack Types plus Normal
- Weight attack types by the inverse of their probability of occurrence so that rare events get more weight than common attacks
- Initial Analyses Model with ALL 41 factors
- Use many types of models and select better ones to average
 - Partition and Bootstrap Forest decision trees (BF was better)
 - Single-Layer, Dual-Layer, and Boosted (sequential) Neural Nets (BN was best)
- Later Analyses Down select to more critical few factors 11 chosen using Bootstrap Forest decision tree method
- Add 3 factors consisting of random data (Normal, Uniform, Integer)
- Stratify attack Types by Train-Validate-Test subsets
- Model the Bias increase weight of misclassified cases ("Nate Silver" approach)





DECISION TREES

- Also known as Recursive Partitioning, CHAID, CART
- Models are a series of nested IF() statements, where each condition in the IF() statement can be viewed as a separate branch in a tree.
- Branches are chosen so that the difference in the average response (or average response rate) between paired branches is maximized.
 - For all factors bin factor values or levels into two buckets such that the means of the two buckets are as far apart as possible.
 - Split on factor with the biggest difference in bucket means.
- Tree models are "grown" by adding more branches to the tree so the more of the variability in the response is explained by the model





DECISION TREE STEP-BY-STEP

Goal is to predict "Rejects" & "Accepts""

Overall Accept Rate is 84.44% Overall Reject Rate is 15.56%



Candidates

| | Candidate | | | - | |
|-------------------|-------------|---|-------------|-------------|---|
| Term | G^2 | | LogWorth | Cut Point | |
| API Particle Size | 4.04050319 | | 0.986886932 | Small,Large | |
| Mill Time | 10.63219688 | | 1.912625603 | 11 | |
| Screen Size | 11.59780917 | > | 2.750476973 | 3,4 |] |
| MgSt Supplier | 1.99715970 | | 0.802459554 | Jones Inc | |
| Lactose Supplier | 1.07597470 | | 0.523458492 | James Ind | |
| Sugar Supplier | 3.99502860 | | 1.340705011 | Sour | |
| Talc Supplier | 0.00000000 | | 0.000000000 | Rough | |
| Blend Time | 2.46622023 | | 0.066048548 | 15.887 | |
| Blend Speed | 6.86574102 | | 0.717212865 | 60.772 | |
| Compressor | 0.00153207 | | 0.013776004 | COMPRESS | |
| Force | 7.53188562 | | 0.855446810 | 24.691 | |
| Coating Supplie | 0.82675321 | | 0.217072294 | Mac | |
| Coating Viscosit | 4.66879353 | | 0.322714711 | 96.413 | |
| Inlet Temp | 7.28399996 | | 0.803171227 | 106.39 | |
| Exhaust Temp | 7.17119361 | | 0.779703315 | 68.592 | |
| Spray Rate | 15.01998363 | < | 2.736639439 | 403.26 | |
| Atom. Pressure | 3.36570749 | | 0.149475063 | 58.787 | |
| | | | | | |

Candidate "X's"

- Search through each of these
- Examine Splits for each unique level in each X
- Find Split that maximizes "LogWorth"
 - Will find split that maximizes difference in proportions of the target variable





DECISION TREE STEP-BY-STEP



Repeat "Split Search" across both "Partitions" of the data. Find optimal split across both branches.





DECISION TREE (STEP BY STEP)

2nd split on Mill Time (< 11 vs. >= 11)

Notice variation in proportion of "1" in each branch







DECISION TREE (STEP BY STEP)

3rd split on Spray Rate (>= 404.1 vs. < 404.1))

Notice variation in proportion of "1" in each branch











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DECISION TREE (STEP BY STEP)

Crossvalidation

| k-fold | | -2LogLike | RSquare |
|--------|-------|------------|---------|
| 5 | Folde | 37.3288048 | 0.5202 |
| | Overa | 30.4046577 | 0.5825 |

Split History



K-Fold in Green

Column Contributions

| | Number | | |
|-------------------|-----------|------------|---------|
| Term | of Splits | G^2 | Portion |
| Mill Time | 1 | 14.7130695 | 0.3104 |
| Spray Rate | 1 | 11.9395178 | 0.2519 |
| Screen Size | 1 | 11.5978092 | 0.2447 |
| Exhaust Temp | 1 | 5.8676817 | 0.1238 |
| Force | 1 | 3.2779318 | 0.0692 |
| API Particle Size | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| MgSt Supplier | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| Lactose Supplier | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| Sugar Supplier | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| Talc Supplier | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| Blend Time | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| Blend Speed | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| Compressor | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| Coating Supplie | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| Coating Viscosit | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| Inlet Temp | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| Atom. Pressure | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |









| | | | Number |
|-----------|---------|-------|-----------|
| | RSquare | Ν | of Splits |
| Training | 0.949 | 75582 | 31 |
| Validatio | 0.815 | 25194 | |
| Test | 0.634 | 25197 | |

Split History



Validation Data in Red Test Data in Orange

Column Contributions

| | Number | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|------------|-------------|
| Term | of Splits | G^2 | Portion |
| service | 5 | 630992.402 | 0.5475 |
| dst_bytes | 4 | 128894.607 | 0.1118 |
| dst_host_diff_srv_rate | 3 | 115626.455 | 0.1003 |
| src_bytes | 8 | 97103.0428 | 0.0843 |
| dst_host_count | 2 | 71772.3696 | 0.0623 |
| count | 3 | 68716.3668 | 0.0596 |
| dst_host_same_src_port_rat | 3 | 19974.724 | 0.0173 |
| dst_host_srv_count | 1 | 10836.2482 | 0.0094 |
| duration | 1 | 5450.42578 | 0.0047 |
| flag | 1 | 3066.0292 | 0.0027 |
| srv_count | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |





DECISION TREE - 11 FACTORS BOOTSTRAP FOREST

| Measure | Training | Validation | Test |
|-----------------------|----------|------------|--------|
| Entropy RSquare | 0.9816 | 0.9798 | 0.9807 |
| Generalized RSquar | 0.9975 | 0.9972 | 0.9974 |
| Mean -Log p | 0.0296 | 0.0324 | 0.0312 |
| RMSE | 0.0834 | 0.0888 | 0.0868 |
| Mean Abs Dev | 0.0235 | 0.0253 | 0.0247 |
| Misclassification Rat | 0.0042 | 0.0055 | 0.0048 |

DECISION TREE - 11 FACTORS

| Measure | Training | Validation | Test |
|-----------------------|----------|------------|--------|
| Entropy RSquare | 0.9486 | 0.8149 | 0.6335 |
| Generalized RSquar | 0.9925 | 0.9661 | 0.9061 |
| Mean -Log p | 0.0828 | 0.2979 | 0.5898 |
| RMSE | 0.1426 | 0.2127 | 0.2811 |
| Mean Abs Dev | 0.0387 | 0.0637 | 0.0969 |
| Misclassification Rat | 0.0230 | 0.0495 | 0.0821 |

Column Contributions

| | Number | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|------------|-------------|
| Ferm | of Splits | G^2 | Portion |
| service | 313 | 6647269.76 | 0.3546 |
| dst_bytes | 318 | 2378144.67 | 0.1269 |
| src_bytes | 642 | 2343701.45 | 0.1250 |
| dst_host_srv_count | 545 | 1371395.91 | 0.0732 |
| count | 384 | 1361411.35 | 0.0726 |
| dst_host_diff_srv_rate | 435 | 988535.468 | 0.0527 |
| lag | 190 | 889445.342 | 0.0475 |
| dst_host_same_src_port_rat | 402 | 881707.319 | 0.0470 |
| dst_host_count | 435 | 700494.072 | 0.0374 |
| srv_count | 287 | 669775.801 | 0.0357 |
| duration | 222 | 511537.238 | 0.0273 |

Column Contributions

| | Number | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|------------|-------------|
| Term | of Splits | G^2 | Portion |
| service | 5 | 630992.402 | 0.5475 |
| dst_bytes | 4 | 128894.607 | 0.1118 |
| dst_host_diff_srv_rate | 3 | 115626.455 | 0.1003 |
| src_bytes | 8 | 97103.0428 | 0.0843 |
| dst_host_count | 2 | 71772.3696 | 0.0623 |
| count | 3 | 68716.3668 | 0.0596 |
| dst_host_same_src_port_rat | 3 | 19974.724 | 0.0173 |
| dst_host_srv_count | 1 | 10836.2482 | 0.0094 |
| duration | 1 | 5450.42578 | 0.0047 |
| flag | 1 | 3066.0292 | 0.0027 |
| srv_count | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| | | | |







- Bootstrap Forest
 - For each tree, take a random sample of the predictor variables (*with replacement*) e.g. pick half of the variables. Build out a decision tree on that subset of variables.
 - Make many trees and average their predictions (bagging)
 - This is also know as a random forest technique
 - Works very well on wide tables.
- Can be used for *both* predictive modeling and variable selection.
- Allows for dominant variables to be excluded from some trees giving less dominant – but still important – variables a chance to be selected.
- Valuable approach for screening variables for use with other modeling methods – e.g. neural networks.





SEE THE TREES IN THE FOREST













COLUMNS CONTRIBUTIONS – VARIABLE SELECTION W/44 FACTORS ORIGINAL 41 FACTORS + RANDOM (NORMAL, UNIFORM & INTEGER)

Column Contributions

| | Number | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------|------------|-------------|
| Term | of Splits | G^2 | Portion |
| service | 450 | 10603400.8 | 0.2831 |
| dst_bytes | 382 | 5308498.33 | 0.1417 |
| src_bytes | 820 | 4771327.16 | 0.1274 |
| count | 337 | 2700247.28 | 0.0721 |
| dst_host_srv_count | 528 | 1990388.66 | 0.0531 |
| dst_host_diff_srv_rate | 415 | 1575488.06 | 0.0421 |
| flag | 168 | 1153015.42 | 0.0308 |
| srv_count | 238 | 1115688.05 | 0.0298 |
| dst_host_serror_rate | 175 | 1060259.19 | 0.0283 |
| duration | 276 | 991351.909 | 0.0265 |
| dst_host_count | 499 | 714300.159 | 0.0191 |
| dst_host_same_src_port_rat | 389 | 616742.634 | 0.0165 |
| hot | 159 | 535399.996 | 0.0143 |
| same_srv_rate | 103 | 422795.794 | 0.0113 |
| dst_host_same_srv_rate | 334 | 421699.768 | 0.0113 |
| diff_srv_rate | 145 | 382986.204 | 0.0102 |
| serror_rate | 65 | 365667.013 | 0.0098 |
| dst_host_rerror_rate | 233 | 318445.492 | 0.0085 |
| dst_host_srv_serror_rate | 117 | 308717.284 | 0.0082 |
| logged_in | 40 | 305603.637 | 0.0082 |
| srv_serror_rate | 30 | 219339.913 | 0.0059 |
| root_shell | 32 | 203921.266 | 0.0054 |
| dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate | 253 | 196905.011 | 0.0053 |
| Random Uniform | 228 | 195145.878 | 0.0052 |
| dst_host_srv_rerror_rate | 81 | 153228.513 | 0.0041 |
| protocol_type | 53 | 152857.046 | 0.0041 |
| is_guest_login | 12 | 137886.036 | 0.0037 |
| Random Normal | 194 | 110253.474 | 0.0029 |
| num_compromised | 39 | 76703.4706 | 0.0020 |
| num_file_creations | 20 | 75279.6937 | 0.0020 |
| wrong_fragment | 29 | 72313.7688 | 0.0019 |
| rerror_rate | 45 | 59525.1111 | 0.0016 |
| num_root | 23 | 41990.5367 | 0.0011 |
| Random Integer | 146 | 21117.3276 | 0.0006 |
| srv_diff_host_rate | 33 | 17448.0232 | 0.0005 |
| num_failed_logins | 7 | 17407.5895 | 0.0005 |
| srv_rerror_rate | 30 | 16080.2873 | 0.0004 |
| num_access_files | 11 | 11528.8834 | 0.0003 |
| num_shells | 11 | 8067.77994 | 0.0002 |
| urgent | 4 | 3131.15585 | 0.0001 |
| su_attempted | 1 | 42.7170189 | 0.0000 |
| land | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| num_outbound_cmds | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| is_host_login | 0 | 0 | 0.0000 |

Column Contributions

| | Number | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|------------|--------------|---------|
| Term | of Splits | G^2 | | Portion |
| service | 450 | 10603400.8 | | 0.2831 |
| dst_bytes | 382 | 5308498.33 | | 0.1417 |
| src_bytes | 820 | 4771327.16 | | 0.1274 |
| count | 337 | 2700247.28 | | 0.0721 |
| dst_host_srv_count | 528 | 1990388.66 | | 0.0531 |
| dst_host_diff_srv_rate | 415 | 1575488.06 | | 0.0421 |
| flag | 168 | 1153015.42 | | 0.0308 |
| srv_count | 238 | 1115688.05 | | 0.0298 |
| dst_host_serror_rate | 175 | 1060259.19 | | 0.0283 |
| duration | 276 | 991351.909 | | 0.0265 |
| dst_host_count | 499 | 714300.159 | 10p 11 01 44 | 0.0191 |
| dst_host_same_src_port_rat | 389 | 616742.634 | | 0.0165 |
| hot | 159 | 535399.996 | | 0.0143 |
| same_srv_rate | 103 | 422795.794 | | 0.0113 |
| dst_host_same_srv_rate | 334 | 421699.768 | | 0.0113 |
| diff_srv_rate | 145 | 382986.204 | | 0.0102 |

Model Validation-Set Summaries

The fit below was the best of these models fit.

| | | Entropy | Misclassification | | | Avg Abs |
|---------|---------|---------|-------------------|------------|------------------|---------|
| N Terms | N Trees | RSquare | Rate | Avg -Log p | RMS Error | Error |
| 11 | 200 | 0.9786 | 0.0040 | 0.0336 | 0.0856 | 0.0279 |
| 14 | 53 | 0.9811 | 0.0040 | 0.0297 | 0.0816 | 0.0243 |
| 18 | 48 | 0.9831 | 0.0039 | 0.0265 | 0.0770 | 0.0215 |





BOOSTED TREE

- Beginning with the first tree (layer) build a small simple tree.
- From the residuals of the first tree, build another small simple tree.
- This continues until a specified number of layers has been fit, or a determination has been made that adding successive layers doesn't improve the fit of the model.
- The final model is the weighted accumulation of all of the model layers.







BOOSTED TREE ILLUSTRATED



Final Model $M = M1 + \varepsilon \cdot M2 + \varepsilon \cdot M3 + \dots + \varepsilon \cdot M49$

 ε is the learning rate





NEURAL NETWORKS

- Neural Networks are highly flexible nonlinear models.
- A neural network can be viewed as a weighted sum of nonlinear functions applied to linear models.
 - The nonlinear functions are called activation functions. Each function is considered a (hidden) node.
 - The nonlinear functions are grouped in layers. There may be more than one layer.
- Consider a generic example where there is a response Y and two predictors X1 and X2. An example type of neural network that can be fit to this data is given in the diagram that follows





EXAMPLE NEURAL NETWORK DIAGRAM







NEURAL NETWORKS

- Big Picture
 - Can model:
 - » Continuous and categorical predictors
 - » Continuous and categorical responses
 - » Multiple responses (simultaneously)
 - Can be numerically challenging and time consuming to fit
 - NN models are very prone to overfitting if you are not careful
 - » There are several ways to help prevent overfitting
 - » Some type of validation is required







NEURAL NET - 11 FACTORS SINGLE-LAYER

Measures Value Value Value Generalized RSquar 0.9814778 0.9764849 0.9805001 Entropy RSquare 0.8857414 0.8610009 0.8807691 RMSE 0.2171407 0.2374758 0.2165633 Mean Abs Dev 0.0928858 0.1022572 0.0937134 Misclassification Rat 0.0567399 0.0656212 0.0555819 -LogLikelihood 69405.509 27962.025 24450.71 Sum Freq 377425.96 125001.47 127437.57

NEURAL NET - 11 FACTORS BOOSTED

| Measures | Value | Value | Value |
|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Generalized RSquar | 0.995034 | 0.9928519 | 0.9891299 |
| Entropy RSquare | 0.9650193 | 0.9508193 | 0.9280062 |
| RMSE | 0.11682 | 0.1384119 | 0.1827829 |
| Mean Abs Dev | 0.0364505 | 0.0414955 | 0.0632023 |
| Misclassification Rat | 0.0162761 | 0.0227104 | 0.0573684 |
| -LogLikelihood | 21248.789 | 9893.5268 | 14763.782 |
| Sum Freq | 377425.96 | 125001.47 | 127437.57 |





NEURAL MODEL PREDICTION PROFILER TOP 10 FACTORS







NEURAL MODEL PREDICTION PROFILER TOP 5 FACTORS



USE OPTIMIZATION TO FIND MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF ATTACK TYPE







BOOTSTRAP FOREST PREDICTION PROFILER TOP 10 FACTORS







TOP – FIT 41 FACTORS | BOTTOM - FIT 11 FACTORS | RESULTS COMPARABLE



Sas HE HOWER

- Add a column of data that weights the misclassified cases differently than the correctly classified cases.
- More heavily penalize errors in predicting Normal than errors in predicting wrong Attacks
- If prediction worsens, then invert bias correction

ACTUAL VS. PREDICTED FOR TEST SUBSET FOR FOUR MODELS USING 11 FACTORS, ENSEMBLE MODELS AND BIAS

| | TVT 60/20/20 Stratified | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|-------|------|-----|---|--|--|--|
| 2 | | | | | | | | |
| | Most Likely Attack Type - 4 Class + no | | | | | | | |
| Attack Type - 4 Class + normal | l dos normal probe r2l ι | | | | | | | |
| dos | 9176 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| normal | 4 | 13448 | 10 | 6 | 1 | | | |
| probe | 5 | 1 | 2326 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| r2l | 2 | 0 | 2 | 194 | 1 | | | |
| u2r | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 7 | | | |

Sas He HOWER TO KNOW.

| Most Likely Attack | Most Likely Attack | Most Likely Attack Most Likely Attack | | 1 | Most Likely A | Attack | |
|-------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------|
| Type - 4 Class + normal | Type - 4 Class + normal 2 Type - 4 Class + norm | | rmal 3 Type - <u>4</u> Class + norm | | | normal | 4 |
| | | | | TVT 60/2 | rati | fied | |
| | | | Most Lil | ely Attack 1 | ype - 4 Cla | iss + ne | ormal |
| | Attack | Type - 4 Class + normal | dos | normal | probe | r2l | u2r |
| | dos | | 9175 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| | norma | l | 7 | 13454 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| | probe | | 1 | 1 | 2330 | 0 | 0 |
| | r2l | | 0 | 1 | 3 | 194 | 1 |
| | u2r | | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 5 |

HOW WOULD ONE USE THIS MODEL?

- Monitor factor settings by capturing 1 million rows of traffic
- Drop into proper columns as inputs
- Have model predict Attack Type
- If prediction is NOT Normal, then investigate further
- Repeat process and automate

IMPORTANT ISSUE

- Attackers are adaptive adversaries
- Must regularly update models

SUMMARY

- · Fit several data mining models to historic cyber attack data
- Used Honest Assessment Approach of dividing data into Train, Validate and Test subsets to prevent overfitting of models
- Used "Ensemble" model averaging to improve prediction
- Used bias weighting of misclassified cases to further improve prediction

Thanks. Questions or comments?

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